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Of What Consequence?:
Sexual Offender Laws and Federal
Habeas Relief
KATHERINE A. MITCHELL*
New concerns for an old writ. The relatively recent advent of sex
offender registries has led to consequences in the habeas corpus
context—and they may be more than collateral. In particular, are
the restraints imposed on registered sex offenders severe enough to
constitute custody for habeas jurisdiction? With a recent split
among the federal circuit courts, this Article attempts to decipher
which side of the split the Supreme Court will—and should—fall.
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INTRODUCTION
“If you dare to prey on our children, the law will follow you
wherever you go—state to state, town to town.”
President Bill Clinton, 19961
Dating back to the Magna Carta,2 the tides of time have produced both ebbs and expansions of the Great Writ’s jurisdictional
reach. Specifically, in the United States, the Supreme Court’s habeas
jurisprudence has transformed considerably—from the Warren
Court’s liberalization of habeas procedure3 to the consequent
pushback from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.4 And with
1

Ron Fournier, Clinton Signs Law on Sex Offenders, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May
18, 1996, at 12.
2
Or, more accurately, to the Unknown Charter, drafted almost a month prior
to the Magna Carta by a delegation of King John’s discontented barons and
“which contained an imperfect transcription” of King Henry I’s Coronation Charter. See Stephen Rohde, From Discontented Barons to Predator Drones, L.A.
REV. BOOKS (June 14, 2015), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/magna-cartafrom-discontented-barons-to-predator-drones/.
3
See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438–39 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 312–13, 317 (1963); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15–19
(1963) (collectively known as the Habeas Trilogy). See also Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953), which was decided directly before Chief Justice Warren was
appointed to the Supreme Court but was nevertheless significant to the series of
habeas cases that followed.
4
See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–91 (1977); Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 521–22 (1982); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134, 136 (1987).
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Congress’s passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),5 the limits of habeas relief continue to evolve.6
Nevertheless, at its core, habeas corpus is largely a jurisdictional issue. The “very essence” of habeas corpus contemplates that the petitioner is in custody;7 therefore, absent custody, a court simply lacks
habeas jurisdiction.8
At its historical roots, habeas custody was a non-issue. With its
Latin name loosely translating to “produce the body,” the writ required a jailer (or custodian) to “produce a prisoner in a court of
law” to review the basis of his or her detention.9 A custodian could
not produce one who was not confined. Due in part to legislative
creativity, however, newly devised sentencing schemes and postconviction requirements have created various quandaries regarding
how to interpret whether a prisoner is “in custody” for habeas purposes.10 Custody, therefore, is no longer limited to actual physical
confinement.11 One such recent legislative creation is the enactment
of various sex offender registration and notification laws, which
continue to impact individuals convicted of sexual offenses long after service of their sentences and periods of supervision.12 In fact,
many of these laws were enacted as post-sentencing measures in an
attempt to protect and notify the public of sex offenders in their respective communities—specifically envisioning that these offenders
would no longer be in physical custody when the requirements attach.13
The Supreme Court has yet to announce whether the consequences of these registration provisions amount to custody required
5

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996).
6
Or devolve, based on your view. See Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of
Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER (June 21, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights.
7
ANDREA D. LYON ET AL., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 93 (2d ed. 2011).
8
Id.
9
See Jonathan Shaw, The War and the Writ: Habeas Corpus and Security in
an Age of Terrorism, HARV. MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 24–25.
10
See LYON ET AL., supra note 7, at 93.
11
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963).
12
LYON ET AL., supra note 7, at 104.
13
See, e.g., Megan’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (permitting states to collect
and release “relevant information” about registered sex offenders to extent that it
is “necessary to protect the public”).
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by habeas; the federal judiciary, however, has been far from silent.
With the recent advent of a split among the circuits14—and the sheer
volume of individuals potentially affected by such a decision15—
this Article attempts to decipher which side of the split the Supreme
Court will—and should—fall. This Article argues that as a matter of
both common sense and judicial precedent, the restraints imposed
on registered sex offenders are sufficiently severe to satisfy habeas
custody. Nevertheless, this Article will also discuss potential—and
well-founded—concerns that may inhibit the Supreme Court from
extending habeas custody beyond its current scope.
I.

“IN CUSTODY” JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT &
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
As mentioned, two basic premises underlie habeas corpus: (1)
that a court is only capable of providing habeas relief to an individual “in custody,” and (2) this traditional limitation is jurisdictional.16
Congress codified this common law understanding of the writ, incorporating the “in-custody” requirement into the federal habeas
statutory scheme.17 Specifically, pertinent provisions of Section
2241(c)—establishing the judiciary’s power to grant the writ—provide:

14
See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183–85 (9th Cir. 1998);
Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521–23 (6th Cir. 2002); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521
F.3d 707, 717–20 (7th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 335–39 (4th
Cir. 2012); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2014);
Piasecki v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161, 177 (3d Cir. 2019).
15
See generally How Many Registered Sex Offenders are There in Your
State?, SAFEHOME.ORG (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.safehome.org/data/registered-sex-offender-stats/ [hereinafter How Many in Your State?] (estimating
752,000 registered sex offenders across U.S. as of fall 2019).
16
See LYON ET AL., supra note 7, at 93; Case Comment, The Custody Requirement and Territorial Jurisdiction in Federal Habeas Corpus: Word v. North
Carolina, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 631 (1970) (“The availability of the ‘great writ’
has been limited, however, by the traditional requirement that the petitioner be ‘in
custody’ under the sentence which he desires to challenge.”); see also Williamson,
151 F.3d at 1182 (“Because the ‘in custody’ requirement is jurisdictional, it is the
first question we must consider on this appeal.” (internal citations omitted)).
17
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254–2255.
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(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless—
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for
trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in
pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order,
process, judgment or decree of a court or judge
of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . .18
Section 2241’s counterparts for state and federal prisoners—sections 2254 and 2255, used predominantly by prisoners seeking habeas relief—contain similar “in-custody” requirements.19
Traditionally, federal courts have narrowly interpreted the “custody” requirement as current, physical confinement.20 Nevertheless,
the Court has recognized a markedly more expansive interpretation
over time, highlighting that the Great Writ “never has been a static,
18

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1)–(3) (emphases added).
Section 2255(a) states that
[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, section 2254(a) states that
[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).
20
See, e.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1885) (denying habeas
petition brought by Navy officer confined to territorial limits of District of Columbia because restraint did not involve “actual confinement or the present means
of enforcing it”).
19
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narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand
purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right
to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.”21 Therefore,
federal habeas review can do more than “reach behind prison walls
and iron bars.”22
In 1963, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of “in custody” to include prisoners placed on parole subject to restrictive conditions that “significantly restrain [their] liberty to do those things
which in this country free men are entitled to do.”23 The Court
pointed to specific restrictions underlying its decision: The parolee
was required to remain in “a particular community, house, and job
at the sufferance of his parole officer”; obtain permission to drive a
vehicle; report to a parole officer and “permit the officer to visit his
home and job at any time”; work regularly; and “live a clean, honest,
and temperate life.”24 The Court also highlighted that the parolee
was subject to re-arrest at any time.25
The Court continued this jurisdictional expansion in Carafas v.
LaVallee, where the Court examined whether habeas jurisdiction
was nullified when a petitioner filed for the writ while incarcerated,
yet was unconditionally released prior to the Court’s issuance of certiorari.26 In a unanimous opinion, the Court found as a threshold
matter that the petitioner’s release did not render his cause moot.27
In so finding, the Court highlighted the derivative social restraints
of the petitioner’s conviction:
In consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage
in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official
of a labor union for a specified period of time; he
cannot vote in any election held in New York State;
he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these “disabilities or burdens [which] may flow from” petitioner’s
conviction, he has “a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
Id.
Id. at 242–43.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
Id. at 237.
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the sentence imposed on him.” On account of these
“collateral consequences,” the case is not moot.28
Having found the case justiciable, the Court then determined that the
federal habeas statute does not limit relief to those in physical custody; thus, it retained jurisdiction.29 And because petitioner “[was]
suffering, and [would] continue to suffer, serious disabilities,” petitioner’s habeas application was entitled to consideration on the merits.30
This holding, however, was significantly undercut in Maleng v.
Cook, where the Court retreated from its liberalization of the habeas
custody requirement.31 The Court held that the mere “possibility” of
a future sentence enhancement is insufficient to establish habeas
custody under a conviction after the sentence imposed has fully expired.32 The Court clarified that its custody finding in Carafas
“rested . . . not on the collateral consequences of the conviction, but
on the fact that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the
challenged conviction at the time the petition was filed.”33 Therefore, once a sentence imposed for a conviction has fully expired,
“the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves
sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’” for habeas purposes.34 Noting that “almost all States have habitual offender
28

Id. at 237–38 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Fiswick
v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946)).
29
Id. at 238–39.
30
Id. at 239 (quoting Fiswick, 329 U.S. at 222); see also Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 50–53 (1968) (decided a few days after Carafas and noting that important constitutional problems may arise as a result of minor offenses; therefore,
petitioners should not be foreclosed from the availability of constitutional protections—despite their expired sentences).
31
See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam).
32
Id.; cf. Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). In
Coss, the Court held that a habeas petitioner can satisfy the “in custody” requirement of section 2254 where his petition can be construed as asserting a challenge
to a current sentence as enhanced by an allegedly invalid prior conviction. Id. at
401–402. The Court nevertheless barred habeas petitioners from using the challenge of a current conviction to concurrently attack the validity of an earlier conviction for which they are no longer in custody, with the sole exception for invalid
predicate convictions based on Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Id. at
404.
33
Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491–92.
34
Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
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statutes,” the Court refused to extend the custodial requirement to
situations “where a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint
from a conviction.”35
Although, taken together, these holdings are somewhat incongruent, they make clear that constructive custody—that is, custody
short of physical confinement—may satisfy the habeas statute’s “incustody” requirement.36 This is so where a petitioner files while subject to significant restraints on his or her liberties that are not otherwise imposed on the general public.37 Nevertheless, the Court is disinclined to find—and has in fact explicitly rejected—collateral consequences alone as sufficient for custody where the petitioner’s sentence has fully expired prior to filing the writ.38 A subtle but significant relationship exists between Article III mootness and the habeas
custody requirement: “collateral consequences can preserve habeas
jurisdiction, once established, against a claim of mootness, but do
not suffice, in and of themselves, in the absence of initial jurisdiction.”39 Thus, collateral consequences alone may suffice to overcome a mootness challenge. They are not, however, sufficient to “initiate a habeas petition.”40
II.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
It is under this framework that the Supreme Court would decide
whether the restrictions imposed by sex offender registration and
notification laws amount to habeas custody. As we will see, such
restrictions are profuse.
35

Id.
See also Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351–52 (1973) (finding habeas
petitioner—released on his own recognizance after sentencing but prior to incarceration—”in custody” for purposes of section 2254 because he was “subject to
restraints not shared by the public generally” (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).
37
Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 240.
38
See, e.g., Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (“[O]nce the sentence imposed for a
conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction
are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes
of a habeas attack upon it.”).
39
Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 147, 157 (2000).
40
Id. (quoting LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 49, at 219
(1981 & Supp. 2000)).
36
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A.

National Outcry: The Influx of Sex Offender Registration
Regulations
The country’s criminal history is rife with so-called “sex crime
waves,” often produced by widespread media coverage of one or
more particularly disturbing—and sometimes sensationalized—sexual offenses.41 These high-profile sex crimes, especially those committed against children, pervade popular, academic, and legislative
discussion, leading to a paroxysm of both public outrage and consequent legislative response.42
For example, in 1947—in the midst of one of recent history’s
purported sex waves—FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s article, How
Safe is Your Daughter?, proclaimed, “The most rapidly increasing
type of crime is that perpetrated by degenerate sex offenders . . . . [It] is taking its toll at the rate of a criminal assault every 43
minutes, day and night in the United States.”43 Several notorious

41

See L. Clovis Hirning, Indecent Exposure and Other Sex Offenses, 7 J.
CLINICAL PSYCH. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 105 (1945); Jill S. Levenson et al., Public
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Problems, 7
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138 (2007); Tamara Rice Lave, Only
Yesterday: The Rise and Fall of Twentieth Century Sexual Psychopathy Laws, 69
LA. L. REV. 549, 551–64 (2009) (discussing a history of sexual psychopathy law
and using a clinical approach to examine whether there was, in fact, a “sex crime
wave”).
42
See Levenson et al., supra note 41, at 138 (“Sex offenders and sex crimes
incite a great deal of fear among the general public and as a result, lawmakers
have passed a variety of social policies designed to protect community members
from sexual victimization.”).
43
J. Edgar Hoover, How Safe is Your Daughter?, AM. MAG., July–Dec. 1947,
at 32 (“Should wild beasts break out of circus cages, a whole city would be mobilized instantly. But depraved human beings, more savage than beasts, are permitted to rove America almost at will.”).
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crimes44 had generated widespread predator panic.45 Engendered,
legislators and law enforcement nationwide set out to crack down
on offenders, enacting sexual psychopath laws that allowed for the
indefinite commitment and treatment of alleged sexual psychopaths.46 These laws drew constitutional criticism and were eventually nullified.47 History reflects, however, that any juncture of societal complacency would be yet again shaken by another eventual
bout of unsettling sexual offenses.48
For present purposes, in the early 1990s, another “wave”49
sparked a torrent of legislative action. In 1994, following the abduction, molestation, and murder of eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling,
Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, establishing the first
national sex offender registry.50 In July of that same year, sevenyear-old Megan Kanka was lured from her front yard with promises
of meeting her neighbor’s new puppy—her neighbor, who,

44

See, e.g., “Moon Maniac” Killer is Executed, HIST. (Nov. 13, 2009),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-moon-maniac (describing Albert Fish, notorious child serial killer, who was executed for abduction, murder,
and cannibalization of ten-year-old Grace Budd); ROBERT A. PRENTKY ET AL.,
SEXUAL PREDATORS 11 (2015) (“What has been referred to as ‘Horror Week’ occurred in November 1949. Three children, aged 6, 7, and 17 months, were sexually assaulted and murdered, all in less than one week.”); Russell B. Porter,
Hauptmann Guilty, Sentenced to Death for the Murder of the Lindbergh Baby,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1935), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/
learning/general/onthisday/big/0213.html (describing trial of the kidnapping and
murder of the infant son of aviation pioneer, Charles Lindbergh).
45
See Lave, supra note 41, at 549–51; see also Alan Greenblatt, Sex Offenders: Will Tough, New Laws do more Harm than Good, 16 CQ RESEARCHER 721,
721, 730, 733 (2006) (noting media’s tendency to focus coverage on “the worst
cases of abduction and abuse,” which incited widespread public fear of sex
crimes).
46
Lave, supra note 41, at 571–72 (“By 1967, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had passed [sexual psychopath] laws.”).
47
Greenblatt, supra note 45, at 733.
48
See generally id. at 730–33 (describing “cycles” that occurred throughout
the 20th century with regard to public reaction to sex offenders).
49
See generally Hirning, supra note 41, at 105 (describing occurrence of “sex
crime waves”).
50
See Greenblatt, supra note 45, at 731; 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–14072 (2000).
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unbeknownst to Megan’s parents, was a convicted sexual predator.51
The child was raped, murdered, and within twenty-four hours, her
body was found dumped in a local park.52 Public outrage ensued.53
Within weeks, the state of New Jersey enacted Megan’s Law, requiring law enforcement to notify communities when sex offenders
moved to or resided in their neighborhoods.54 By the time Congress
enacted a federal counterpart in 1996, Megan’s Law had passed in
an additional thirty-five states.55 By the mid-1990s, mainstream media’s representation of sexual crimes “became increasingly dominated by the figure of the ‘pedophile,’ understood as an individual
with an incurable and uncontrollable desire for sexual contact with
children.”56
This wave carried over into the new millennium, and from 1996
to 2003, Congress passed a series of bills “to enhance, clarify and
strengthen the provisions of the Wetterling Act.”57 In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”), wholly rewriting the minimum federal standards for
sex offender registration and notification by, among other things,
expanding the number and types of sex offenses that require registration.58

51

Olivia B. Waxman, The History Behind the Law That Created a Registry
of Sex Offenders, TIME (May 30, 2017, 9:30 AM), http://time.com/4793292/history-origins-sex-offender-registry/.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (1994).
55
Greenblatt, supra note 45, at 731, 735; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071(e),
14072(f) (amending Wetterling Act, removing requirement that registry information be kept confidential, and adding a mandatory community notification provision).
56
Tanya Serisier, Sex Crimes and the Media, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. (Jan. 2017), https://oxfordre.com/criminology/
view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079-e118.
57
For an overview of federal sex offender and notification laws, see Legislative History of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification, SMART OFF.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.smart.gov/legislation.htm.
58
See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 34 U.S.C.
§§ 20911–20962.
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To make clear, although Congress has its finger in the pie, sex
offender registration is primarily conducted at the local level.59
Every state and territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, and nearly 150 Native American tribes have established their
own sex offender registration and notification systems.60 Each system contains “its own nuances and distinct features,” including individual “determinations about who is required to register, what information offenders must provide, [and] which offenders are posted
on the jurisdiction’s public registry website.”61 Nonetheless, regardless of the jurisdiction and its respective nuances, many of the restraints imposed on registered sex offenders share common characteristics.62
B.
Consequences of Conviction: Sex Offender Restraints
Generally, sex offenders are required to register and “update
their registration in each jurisdiction they live, work, or attend
school.”63 Often, offenders are categorized into tiers based on the
severity of their offenses; these tiers in turn determine registration
requirements, including how often an offender must report to the

59

SMART OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES 1 (2019),
https://www.smart.gov/caselaw/Case-Law-Update-2019-Compiled.pdf [hereinafter CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES]; see also SMART OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., SORNA IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS 2 (2017), https://www.smart.gov/
pdfs/sorna/SORNAImplementationDocs.pdf (“[J]urisdictions that fail to substantially implement SORNA are subject to a [ten] percent penalty reduction in its
Byrne Justice Assistance Grant formula funds.”).
60
CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES, supra note 59, at 1.
61
Id.
62
For the sake of relative brevity, this Article will not address jurisdictional
registration differences but will touch upon those commonly imposed. It is important to note—and this Article does recognize—that case law may turn on the
individual restrictions—some more severe than others—imposed in a certain
state, especially in the context of what amounts to a “significant restraint on liberty” to suffice as “custody” for habeas purposes.
63
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and-notification-act-sorna (last updated May 28, 2020); 34 U.S.C. § 20913 (2018) (originally enacted as part of Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42
U.S.C. § 16913 (2006)).
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state.64 Offenders are typically required to provide a verifiable address, place of employment, current photograph, vehicle information, and email address.65 Most states also impose residential restrictions, prohibiting offenders from residing within a certain zone
of “schools, parks, day care centers, bus stops, or other places commonly frequented by children.”66 Sex offenders report difficulties
finding and maintaining employment, threats and physical assault,
as well as detrimental familial consequences.67 Certain states permit
the indefinite civil commitment of individuals determined to be sexually violent predators after completion of their prison term.68 A
failure to register, keep current, or comply with registration restrictions subjects eligible offenders to separate charges—“often at

64

See Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the WellIntended Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
697, 702–03 (2008).
65
See, e.g., Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (10th
Cir. 2014) (also requiring petitioner to appear annually at local sheriff’s office to
be photographed and fingerprinted, as well as to provide any other internet identifiers).
66
Jill S. Levenson, Restricting Sex Offender Residences: Policy Implications,
36 HUM. RTS. 21 (2009), see also People v. Oberlander, No. 02–354, 2008 WL
3390455, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2008) (discussing case of a convicted sex
offender who was unable to live within walking distance of a synagogue as required by Orthodox Jewish religion because he is forbidden to “reside, work or
loiter” within [1000] feet of a “public or private, elementary, middle or high
school, child care facility, park, playground, public or private youth center, or
public swimming pool”).
67
Sarah W. Craun & David M. Bierie, Are the Collateral Consequences of
Being a Registered Sex Offender as Bad as We Think?, 78 FED. PROB. June 2014,
at 28–29 (“[B]etween 5 percent and 10 percent of registered sex offenders reported being physically assaulted or injured, and 18 percent had their property
damaged. Nearly half reported losing a friend due to being discovered as a registered sex offender.” (internal citation omitted)); see generally Ashley Kilmer &
Chrysanthi S. Leon, “Nobody Worries About Our Children”: Unseen Impacts of
Sex Offender Registration on Families with School-Age Children and Implications for Desistance, 30 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 181–82 (2017) (discussing impact of
sex offender policies on children of registrants).
68
See Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued
Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213, 214–15 (2011). These
civil commitment statutes will not be discussed for our purposes but are mentioned as an example of the often-severe restraints imposed on convicted sex offenders.
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the felony level.”69 United States Supreme Court Justice David
Souter, concurring in the Court’s decision to reject an ex post facto
challenge to an Alaskan registration law, encapsulated the consequences faced by registered sexual offenders:
[T]here is significant evidence of onerous practical
effects of being listed on a sex offender registry. See,
e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279 (2d Cir.
1997) (noting “numerous instances in which sex offenders have suffered harm in the aftermath of notification—ranging from public shunning, picketing,
press vigils, ostracism, loss of employment, and
eviction, to threats of violence, physical attacks, and
arson”); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d
Cir. 1997) (“The record documents that registrants
and their families have experienced profound humiliation and isolation as a result of the reaction of those
notified. Employment and employment opportunities
have been jeopardized or lost. Housing and housing
opportunities have suffered a similar fate. Family
and other personal relationships have been destroyed
or severely strained. Retribution has been visited by
private, unlawful violence and threats and, while
such incidents of ‘vigilante justice’ are not common,
they happen with sufficient frequency and publicity
that registrants justifiably live in fear of
them”) . . . .70
Notably, these observations were made prior to Congress’s enactment of SORNA, which—along with its state counterparts—made
“sex offenders’ registration obligations considerably more

69

Logan, supra note 39, at 162–63 (footnotes omitted).
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 109 n.* (2003) (Souter, J., concurring). In the
same decision, Justice Stevens found that the statutes “impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they apply.” Id. at
111 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition to residential registration, offenders “may
not shave their beards, color their hair, change their employer, or borrow a car
without reporting those events to the authorities.” Id.
70
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burdensome.”71 In many states, these requirements may be imposed
for the entirety of an offender’s natural life.72
III.
DO THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
& NOTIFICATION LAWS SATISFY THE “IN CUSTODY” STANDARD FOR
HABEAS RELIEF?
Although these consequences are, as described by Justice
Souter, “onerous,” whether they suffice to satisfy the habeas corpus
“in-custody” requirement remains unsettled.73 Various federal circuit courts have maintained a uniform stance on the matter, overwhelmingly in agreement that sex offender registration and notification laws do not pose “the type of severe, immediate restraint[s]
on physical liberty” required to establish custody.74 That is, until the
Third Circuit weighed in.
A.
The Circuit Courts Weigh In
As the first federal appellate court to address the issue, the Ninth
Circuit set the precedential bar in Williamson v. Gregoire.75 In determining this “novel” question, the court “rel[ied] heavily on the
notion of a physical sense of liberty—that is, whether the legal disability in question somehow limits the putative habeas petitioner’s
movement.”76 Highlighting the physicality required for custodial restraints, the Ninth Circuit rejected registration and notification as
“significant restraint[s] on Williamson’s physical liberty”77:
The sex offender registration and notification provisions apply to Williamson whether he stays in the
same place or whether he moves. Indeed, even if
71

See Piasecki v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2019).
See id. at 164.
73
Smith, 538 U.S. at 109 n.*.
74
Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d
518, 521–23 (6th Cir. 2002); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717–20 (7th Cir.
2008); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 335–38 (4th Cir. 2012); Calhoun v. Att’y
Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1073–74 (10th Cir. 2014).
75
Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1182.
76
Id. at 1182–83.
77
Id. at 1183.
72
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Williamson never leaves his house, he must still verify his address with the sheriff every year. The Washington sex offender law does not require Williamson
even to personally appear at a sheriff’s office to register; registration can be accomplished by mail. Thus,
the law neither targets Williamson’s movement in order to impose special requirements, nor demands his
physical presence at any time or place. Furthermore,
the law does not specify any place in Washington or
anywhere else where Williamson may not go.78
Because Williamson did not need government pre-approval so
long as he complied with the notice requirements, the court distinguished the affirmative physical movements required in situations
such as parole and recognizance release, and an outright prohibition
on certain physical movements.79 Therefore, the court held, “Williamson cannot say that there is anywhere that the sex offender law
prevents him from going.”80 The court continued by acknowledging
that, although Williamson may be disincentivized to move or travel,
any such disincentive was the result of a “subjective chill,” and thus,
was insufficient to establish custody.81
Equating registration laws to restitution orders, the Ninth Circuit
went on to reject any argument that the “mere potential for future
incarceration, without any present restraint on liberty, can satisfy the
‘in custody’ requirement.”82 Though any such incarceration would
undoubtedly limit Williamson’s movement, the court emphasized
that this potentiality was entirely dependent on Williamson’s willingness to obey the law.83 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit buttressed its
decision by reinforcing its previous determination that

78

Id. at 1184.
Id.
80
Id. at 1184.
81
Id. (“Certainly, the loss of a driver’s license amounts to a much greater
limitation on one’s freedom of movement than does the Washington sex offender
law, but the former does not satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirement either.”).
82
Id.
83
Id.
79

92

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:76

Washington’s sex offender law is regulatory rather than punitive.84
The “civil” nature of the law therefore “bolster[ed] [its] conclusion
that the registration and notification provisions are more analogous
to a loss of the right to vote or own firearms, or the loss of a professional license, rather than probation or parole.”85 Thus, the petitioner
was not in custody for federal habeas purposes.86
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s rationale was threefold: (1) the court
focused on the physicality of custody, looking to affirmative restraints on a petitioner’s “movement”; (2) the “mere potential for
future incarceration” is insufficient; and (3) the regulations are remedial rather than punitive.87
Until early 2019, the federal appellate bench uniformly applied
this rationale throughout the circuits. Relying almost exclusively on
the language of Williamson and its Ninth Circuit progeny,88 the
Sixth, Seventh, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have each reaffirmed this
trinity of custodial analysis.89 This is so despite clear factual differences specific to each case—both procedurally and statutorily. For
example, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits rejected similar claims from
petitioners who were currently incarcerated while their petitions for
habeas were pending.90 The Seventh Circuit explained that, because
it deemed sex offender registration noncustodial, the court did not
have pendent jurisdiction over the claim—despite the fact that registration was required under the same sentence petitioner was currently incarcerated and his habeas petition included an independent

84

Id. (citing Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining whether Washington sex offender statute constituted punishment for ex
post facto purposes)).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See id.
88
See Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999); McNab v.
Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999).
89
See Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 522–23 (6th Cir. 2002); Virsnieks v.
Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332,
337–39 (4th Cir. 2012); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074
(10th Cir. 2014).
90
Leslie, 296 F.3d at 522 (“Although Leslie is currently incarcerated, he is
not seeking relief from the conviction or sentence upon which his confinement is
based.”); Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719–22.
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custodial claim.91 Further, although the Williamson court emphasized that the law did not require in-person registration,92 its sister
circuits have summarily extended the holding to statutes that do.93
As recently as 2016, the Tenth Circuit, while acknowledging Oklahoma’s registration requirements as more restrictive than those it
considered in the past, conclusively—that is, without discussion of
any statutory specificities—decided that they do not “impose a severe restraint on [petitioner’s] freedom sufficient to satisfy the ‘in
custody’ requirement of § 2254.”94 Sex offender registration and notification schemes have evolved to become increasingly burdensome; however, the judicial system had seemingly turned a blind
eye.
In March of 2019, a split emerged. Thus, so too did a glimmer
of hope for those wishing to use habeas as a vehicle to challenge
their sex offender registration. In Piasecki v. Court of Common
Pleas, the Third Circuit explicitly departed from its sister circuits,
finding registration requirements imposed “severe restraints
on . . . liberty not shared by the public generally,” and thus,
amounted to custody.95 Indeed, the court found the question “easily
answered.”96 Emphasizing that post-SORNA restrictions are more
onerous than those of earlier decisions, the panel noted specific restraints imposed on the petitioner:
At a minimum, Piasecki was required “to be in a certain place” or “one of several places”—a State Police
91

Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 722 (“Given the [habeas] statute’s uniform focus on
custodial sentences, ‘there is . . . no reason why the presence of a plausible claim
against a custodial punishment should make a noncustodial punishment more
amenable to collateral review that it otherwise might be.’” (quoting Kaminski v.
United States, 339 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2003))).
92
Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184.
93
Leslie, 296 F.3d at 521–22 (holding that Ohio’s sex offender registration,
requiring in-person registration, did not constitute custody); Wilson, 689 F.3d at
338 (same conclusion for Virginia and Texas statutes); Calhoun, 745 F.3d at
1072–73 (same conclusion for Colorado statute); see also Henry, 164 F.3d at 1242
(“Registration, even if it must be done in person at the police station, does not
constitute the type of severe, immediate restraint on physical liberty necessary to
render a petitioner ‘in custody’ for the purposes of federal habeas relief.”).
94
Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693 (10th Cir. 2016).
95
Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161, 172–72 (3d Cir. 2019).
96
Id. at 170.
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barracks—at least four times a year for the rest of his
life. The state’s ability to compel a petitioner’s attendance weighs heavily in favor of concluding that
the petitioner was in custody . . . .Any change of address, including any temporary stay at a different residence, required an accompanying trip to the State
Police barracks within three business days. He was
even required to regularly report to police if he had
no address and became homeless. In addition, Piasecki could have no “computer internet use.” The
SORNA statute also compelled Piasecki to personally report to the State Police if he operated a car,
began storing his car in a different location, changed
his phone number, or created a new email address.97
Accordingly, the court found that petitioner “was not free to ‘come
and go as he please[d],’”98 and these “compulsory, physical restraints not shared by the public generally . . . severely conditioned
his freedom of movement.”99 The court specifically rejected other
circuits’ reliance on government “pre-approval” as the litmus for
custody and further emphasized that “any failure to abide by the restrictions” subjected Piasecki to felony charges.100 Therefore,
“[g]iven the level of restriction imposed by the registration requirements and the harsh consequences that would result from failing to
adhere to them,” the Third Circuit held that these restrictions were
“severe” and “clearly r[o]se to the level of ‘custody’ for purposes of
[its] habeas jurisdiction.”101
IV.
THE SUPREME COURT COMES CLOSE
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the consequences of sex offender registration and notification laws satisfy the

97

Id. at 170–71 (footnotes omitted) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.15(a)–
(g) (West 2018)).
98
Id. at 170 (quoting Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
99
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351).
100
Id. at 171–72.
101
Id. at 171, 173.
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“in-custody” standard.102 With the recent emergence of a circuit
split, however, the Supreme Court could undertake the opportunity
to resolve the issue. This would not be the Court’s first attempt.
A.
United States v. Juvenile Male
In 2010, the Court came close. In the per curiam decision of
United States v. Juvenile Male,103 the Court, considering the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, postponed addressing the
Ninth Circuit’s determination that SORNA violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent prior to
SORNA’s enactment.104 First, the Court noted, it was required to
address its own jurisdictional limitations: the justiciability of the
case due to mootness.105
For context, in 2005—prior to the enactment of SORNA—the
respondent, “Juvenile Male,” was charged with juvenile delinquency in the United States District Court for the District of Montana for “knowingly engaging in sexual acts with a person under 12
years of age.”106 The respondent pled “true” to the charge and was
subsequently adjudicated delinquent.107 The respondent was sentenced to two years of “official detention and juvenile delinquent
supervision until his [twenty-first] birthday.”108 Additionally, the
102

See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (explaining that, once a petitioner’s sentence has expired, he must show a “collateral consequence” in order
to maintain a suit).
103
United States v. Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. 558 (2010) (per curiam).
104
Id. at 560; see United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 927–28 (9th
Cir. 2010).
105
Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 560. For a (slightly dated) discussion on federal
jurisdictional limitations of mootness, see Sidney A. Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 125–27 (1946).
In the United States federal courts, this [mootness] limitation is
more than a rule of decision; it is a constitutional requirement.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal judicial system to “cases” and “controversies.” A lawsuit which is, or has become, moot is neither a case
nor a controversy in the constitutional sense and no federal
court has the power to decide it.
Id. at 125–26 (internal citations omitted).
106
Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 559.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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court ordered respondent to “spend the first six months of his juvenile supervision in a prerelease center and to abide by the center’s
conditions of residency.”109
In the midst of respondent’s sentence, Congress enacted
SORNA, which, with respect to juvenile offenders, requires juveniles adjudicated delinquent for certain serious sex offenses to comply with registration requirements in each jurisdiction where they
live, work, and attend school.110 In February of 2007, the Attorney
General issued an interim rule that applied SORNA’s requirements
“to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of
[SORNA].”111 Effectively, this rule mandated that SORNA’s sex
109

Id.
Id.; see 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20945 (Sex Offender Registration and Notification).
111
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8897 (Feb.
28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2012)). As an aside, the Supreme Court
recently issued an opinion in the case Gundy v. United States, in which Hernan
Gundy challenged the provisions of SORNA that give the United States Attorney
General the discretion to decide whether the registration and notifications requirements should apply to offenders convicted pre-enactment. Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). Gundy argued that those provisions were violative of the
nondelegation doctrine, which prohibits Congress from delegating broad legislative functions to the executive branch. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–6,
Gundy, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (No. 17-6086). A decision finding the SORNA provision
an impermissible delegation of authority to the executive branch could have arguably raised habeas implications. The “‘historical core’ of the writ is tethered to
the notion that non-judicial—i.e., executive or legislative—detentions warrant
substantive review and oversight by a neutral judicial branch.” LYON ET AL., supra
note 7, at 9 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2007)). There are, of
course, nuances about registration requirements that may render this a moot point,
such as whether they amount to custody to begin with and whether they are the
product of a full hearing, but nevertheless, the broad concept that the Attorney
General—a member of the executive branch—is entitled to determine whether
pre-enactment offenders must comply by the restrictions would have further support the idea that sex offender registration and notification provisions perhaps fall
within the historical scope of habeas corpus as quasi-executive detention.
Alas, the Supreme Court did not so hold. And, thus, any nuanced habeas
implications were thereby temporarily extinguished—with emphasis on temporarily. The dissenting Justices, as well as Justice Alito in the concurrence, indicated a strong desire to reconsider the way the Court has analyzed nondelegation
arguments over the past eighty-four years. Gundy, 138 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J.,
concurring); id. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). And with the Court’s recent
110
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offender registration requirements applied to all sex offenders, including those who were charged with qualifying pre-enactment offenses.112
As Murphy’s Law would have it, in July 2007, the district court
found that Juvenile Male had failed to comply with the requirements
of the prerelease program and revoked his supervision, mandating
an additional six-month term of detention followed by a period of
supervision up until his twenty-first birthday.113 In addition, the government invoked SORNA’s pre-enactment registration provisions,
arguing that respondent should also be required to register as a sex
offender.114 The judge agreed, and, as “special conditions” of his
supervision, ordered the respondent to register as a sex offender.115
Respondent appealed this “special condition” of supervision to the
Ninth Circuit.116
In May 2008, with his appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit, respondent turned twenty-one.117 Thus, his juvenile supervision expired, including the provisions requiring him to register as a sex offender.118 Subsequently, without addressing any issue of mootness,
the Ninth Circuit held that the retroactive application of SORNA in
the juvenile adjudication context violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
and vacated the sex offender registration requirements imposed by
the district court as a condition of respondent’s juvenile supervision.119 Nonetheless, by the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, respondent had registered as a sex offender in Montana.120

trajectory matching the conservative voices in the dissent, this could indicate a
redetermination of the merits of Gundy’s arguments. Then again, nondelegation
arguments arise in varying contexts—not just under SORNA—so if the Court
were to undertake the argument once again, it could very well be in one of these
alternative contexts and Gundy’s SORNA implications may remain.
112
See 28 C.F.R. § 72.3; see also Anna Christensen, SORNA and the Ex Post
Facto Clause, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2010, 9:00 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/sorna-and-the-ex-post-facto-clause/.
113
Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 559.
114
Id. at 559–60.
115
Id.
116
Id.; United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2010).
117
See Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 560.
118
Id.
119
Id.; see Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d at 927.
120
Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 560–61.
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Based on these facts, the Supreme Court deferred ruling on the
ex post facto issue and, instead, certified the following question to
the Montana Supreme Court:
Is respondent’s duty to remain registered as a sex offender under Montana law contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal juvenile-supervision order that required him to register
as a sex offender, or is the duty an independent requirement of Montana law that is unaffected by the
validity or invalidity of the federal juvenile-supervision conditions?121
Because respondent solely challenged the conditions of his juvenile
supervision requiring him to register as a sex offender, and because
that term of supervision had since expired, the Court found that the
case was likely moot “unless respondent [could] show that a decision invalidating the sex-offender-registration conditions of his juvenile supervision would be sufficiently likely to redress ‘collateral
consequences adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.’”122
The Court Throws a Bone
B.
Though not directly deciding the mootness issue itself, the Court
highlighted that “the most likely potential ‘collateral consequenc[e]’
that might be remedied by a judgment in respondent’s favor is the
requirement that respondent remain registered as a sex offender under Montana law.”123 Thus, the Court sought to ascertain “whether
a favorable decision in [respondent’s] case would make it sufficiently likely that respondent ‘could remove his name and identifying information from the Montana sex offender registry.’”124 Essentially, the Court wanted to know whether the separate registration
under Montana law derived from, or was caused by, the federal district court’s order that had since expired.125 Was respondent’s
121

Id. at 561 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 560 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14 (1998)).
123
Id. at 560–61.
124
Id. at 561 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Juvenile Male 560
U.S. 558 (No. 09-940)).
125
See id. at 560–61.
122
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Montana sex offender registration a collateral consequence of his
federal sentence?126
Unfortunately for respondent, the Montana Supreme Court clarified that respondent’s “state law duty to remain registered as a sex
offender [was] not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of
his federal supervision order” and continued to apply regardless of
the outcome of his federal appeal.127 Satisfied, the Supreme Court
ruled that respondent’s appeal was moot, that as such, the Ninth Circuit lacked any power to decide the ex post facto issue, and that the
judgment was vacated with remand instructions to dismiss.128 The
Court also rejected respondent’s argument against mootness based
on “‘an independent duty to register as a sex offender’ under
SORNA itself,” finding that “the duty to register under SORNA is
not a consequence—collateral or otherwise—of the District Court’s
special conditions of supervision.”129 Respondent’s statutory duty to
register under SORNA was an obligation independent of his supervision conditions.130
In sum, respondent’s conviction left him with three distinct duties to register as a sex offender: (1) as a condition of his juvenile
supervision pursuant to the district court’s order; (2) independently
under the requirements of the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender
Registration Act; and (3) as an independent statutory duty pursuant
to SORNA.131 His appeal challenged only the first, and thus, when
126

See id.
United States v. Juvenile Male, 255 P.3d 110, 111 (Mont. 2011). The Montana Supreme Court based its ruling on the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender
Registration Act (“SVORA”), which was enacted in 1989, and “generally imposes
a lifetime requirement, unless relieved by court order, upon sexual offenders to
register with a law enforcement agency when present in Montana.” Id. at 112; see
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-506(1), 46-23-506 (3) (West 2009). Under Montana
law, sexual offenders convicted in other jurisdictions for offenses “reasonably
equivalent” to state sexual offenses are required to register under SVORA. Juvenile Male, 255 P.3d at 112. Therefore, because the court found respondent’s federal conviction to be “reasonably equivalent” to Montana’s sexual assault on a
child offense, respondent’s duty to register as a sex offender in Montana was “entirely independent from the registration conditions imposed by his federal supervision order.” Id. at 115.
128
United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937–39 (2011) (per curiam).
129
Id. at 937–38.
130
Id. at 938.
131
See generally id. at 933–39.
127
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it expired, so too did the justiciability of his appeal.132 The Court
simply lacked Article III jurisdiction.133
Despite the Court’s narrow dismissal as applied to respondent’s
appeal, the Court’s dicta suggests that sex offender registration requirements—if challenged properly—could suffice as collateral
consequences sufficiently restrictive for habeas jurisdiction.134 Similar to Carafas and Sibron, Juvenile Male can be viewed as a mootness case informed by the habeas “in custody” requirement. Note,
however, that the case was not decided in the posture of a habeas
petition, nor does the Court mention “custody” in either of its two
opinions. But the Court’s reliance on Spencer v. Kemna—a habeas
“in custody” decision—to determine its jurisdictional limits based
on a collateral consequence issue could reflect—or imply—the
Court’s view on whether sexual offender registration requirements
are sufficient restraints on liberty to deem an offender “in custody”
for habeas purposes.135
V.

THE CONSEQUENCE OF PRECEDENT: REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS AS A SEVERE RESTRAINT ADEQUATE FOR HABEAS
REVIEW?
Should the Supreme Court accept the opportunity to decide the
issue, it may find itself in a somewhat self-imposed conundrum.
132

See id. at 934, 937–38.
Id. at 938–39.
134
Id. at 937 (“True, a favorable decision in this case might serve as a useful
precedent for respondent in a hypothetical lawsuit challenging Montana’s registration requirement on ex post facto grounds. But this possible, indirect benefit in
a future lawsuit cannot save this case from mootness.”). Additionally, the Court
noted that SORNA’s “continuing obligation [to register] might provide grounds
for a preenforcement challenge to SORNA’s registration requirements. It does
not, however, render the current controversy regarding the validity of respondent’s sentence any less moot.” Id. at 938.
135
See id. at 935; Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 14 (1998). On the other
hand, the Court has denied certiorari in subsequent cases arising from the same,
or sufficiently similar, challenges to sex offender registration requirements. See
Calhoun v. Suthers, 135 S. Ct. 376, 376 (2014) (mem.); Brief for the Petitioner at
5-11, Calhoun, 135 S. Ct. 376 (No. 14-216); Wilson v. Flaherty, 133 S. Ct. 2853,
2853 (2013) (mem.); Brief for the Petitioner at 1, 8–20, Wilson, 133 S.Ct. 2853
(No. 12-986); Dickey v. Allbaugh, 137 S. Ct. 2293, 2293 (2016) (mem.); Brief
for the Petitioner at 1, 8–12, Dickey, 137 S. Ct. 2293 (No. 16-1006).
133
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Based on the Court’s custodial jurisprudence, modern sex offender
registration requirements, and the restraints thereby imposed, undoubtedly amount to custody for habeas purposes. Nevertheless, the
Court’s findings in other contexts, paired with well-founded policy
concerns, may inhibit the Court from extending its habeas jurisdiction.
A.

Turning a Blind Eye – The Practical Effects of Sex
Offender Registries as Habeas Custody
A finding that the deprivations on liberty incident to modern sex
offender registration requirements are anything short of “severe” is
patently at odds with the practical effects of such requirements.
Even if weight is to be afforded to Williamson’s narrow reliance on
physical restraints of movement,136 the increasingly onerous requirements and limitations imposed on sex offenders undoubtedly
satisfy this standard137—despite the politically and judicially expedient findings of the federal appellate courts.138 The severity of these
restraints—significantly burdensome even at first blush—is compounded by the tangible and intangible effects deriving from such
limitations.
As discussed, offenders are required to register and keep the
state constantly apprised of their whereabouts, including where they
live, work, and travel.139 However, registration requirements have
further evolved to ensure that offenders are in fact limited in their
movements, acting in effect to quarantine registrants to designated
areas of the community.140 Residency restrictions, for example, are
some of the more egregious aspects of registration requirements in
terms of restraints on movement.141 Empirical data confirms that
such “buffer zones,” which prohibit residency within a certain
136

See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998).
See supra Part II.B.
138
See supra Part III.A. See generally Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184;
Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 722 (7th Cir. 2008); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d
518, 522 (6th Cir. 2002).
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See, 34 U.S.C. § 20913; Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
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See Jill S. Levenson & Andrea L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Unintended Consequences and Community Reentry, 9 JUST. RSCH. &
POL’Y 59, 63 (2007).
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See id.
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proximity to places frequented by children, leave offenders with little housing availability, and often force offenders into isolation, unable to live with their own family members.142 In the vast majority
of metropolitan and suburban areas, one would be hard-pressed to
find compliant housing not within close proximity to a school, day
care center, park, or bus stop.143
For instance, in Orange County, Florida, ninety-nine percent
(99%) of all residential properties fall within a buffer zone.144 In
Newark, New Jersey, ninety-three percent (93%) of residences are
located within 2,500 feet of a school, and a study of four metropolitan areas in South Carolina found that forty-five percent (45%) of
housing is within 1,000 feet of a school or day care center.145 When
Miami-Dade County adopted an ordinance banning sex offenders
from living within a 2,500-foot buffer zone, Miami’s Julia Tuttle
Causeway became a state-sanctioned encampment of tents and
shacks specifically designated for such offenders.146 Homelessness
was the sole legal option for those wishing to legally reside in the
county.147
To claim that offenders subject to such restrictions “cannot say
that there is anywhere that the sex offender law prevents [them] from
going” is to rule in purposeful disregard of not only the actual, physical restraints imposed on offenders, but of the very explicit language of the restrictions themselves.148 Blind adherence to the Williamson rationale is anachronistic to current reality.
Rather, judicial interpretation of these requirements should aim
to keep pace with the ever-increasing burdens imposed by new
142

Id. at 61–63.
See generally Levenson, supra note 66.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Greg Allen, Sex Offenders Forced To Live Under Miami Bridge, NPR
(May 20, 2009, 2:33PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104150499 (“‘You don’t lose votes by being tough on sex offenders,’ [columnist Fred Grimm] says. ‘We’ve all seen . . . spontaneous homeless camps pop
up. But this is a camp created by public policy.’”).
147
See id.
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See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998); see also
Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[Petitioner] is free to live, work, travel, and engage in all legal activities without limitation and without approval by a government official.”).
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registration regimes. As Judge Andre Davis of the Fourth Circuit
noted, “viewed pragmatically, as they should be, the requirements
operate de facto as probationary terms, the violation of which are
expected to lead to the imposition, upon conviction, of custodial sentences.”149 As such, registration and notification requirements are
entitled to the same custodial interpretation as applied to parole,150
probation,151 bail,152 personal recognizance release,153 pendent consecutive sentences,154 community service,155 and fourteen hours of
required alcohol rehabilitation classes156—all of which have been
upheld as sufficiently custodial for habeas purposes.157 Further, the
increased prevalence of in-person registration requirements creates
a scheme more analogous to parole, and the Jones Court’s illustration of significant restraints on liberty—such as confinement to a
particular “community, home, [and] job”—are more in line with the
practical realities facing registered sex offenders today than the
mere loss of a license as described in Williamson.158 As the Supreme
Court has made clear, “[i]t is not relevant that conditions and restrictions such as these may be desirable and important parts of the
rehabilitative process; what matters is that they significantly restrain
[a] petitioner’s liberty to do those things which in this country free
men are entitled to do.”159
This conclusion is further bolstered by the legislative origins of
sex offender registration regulations, which “were conceived as
149

Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2012) (Davis, J., concur-

ring).
150

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242–43 (1963).
See Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978); Caldwell
v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that probation and deferred
probation orders are custodial for habeas purposes); Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d
74, 78–79 (1st Cir. 2003) (same); Malinovsky v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 7 F.3d
1263, 1265 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
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Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 286 n.2, 291 n.8 (1975).
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Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 346 (1973).
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Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968).
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Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Logan, supra note 39, at 153 (collecting cases).
158
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159
Jones, 371 U.S. at 242–43.
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means to discourage criminals from locating in an area in the first
place, and as a ready basis for arrest should the registration requirement not be met.”160 As quoted in Professor Logan’s article, an early
commentator stated:
The immediate objectives of these ordinances appeared to be the incarceration or expulsion of undesirables, rather than the registration of criminals. It
was believed that the individuals affected would
move elsewhere to avoid registration. However, as
more jurisdictions adopted these ordinances, a convicted person would be less able and less likely to
escape registration by moving. Therefore, the principal mode of evasion would tend to become a failure
to register with the consequent fulfillment of only the
incarceration objective.161
Failing to recognize the practical effects of sex offender registration
requirements for what they are—and what they were fully intended
to be—is tantamount to turning a judicial blind eye to both precedent
and reality.
B.
Why the Court May Not Budge
Both instinctually and as a matter of precedent, sex offender registration and notification requirements amount to the breed of severe
restraints on liberty sufficient for the jurisdictional reach of habeas
custody. To hold otherwise would simply perpetuate a legal fiction.
Nonetheless, prudential reasons exist as to why the Supreme Court
may either refuse to extend habeas custody to registration, or refuse
to address the issue at all, choosing instead to maintain the jurisprudential status quo of the lower courts.

160

Logan, supra note 39, at 159 (noting that another basic foundation of registration regulations was the idea that sex offenders pose a heightened risk of recidivism).
161
Id. (quoting Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over
Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 63 (1954)).
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1. THE “PUNISHMENT” HURDLE
As made clear by Williamson and its progeny, numerous appellate circuits have determined that sex offender registration and notification laws are remedial rather than punitive.162 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed this concept,163 and in fact, has further
determined that indefinite civil commitment of sex offenders does
not run afoul of the Constitution for similar reasons.164 In Smith v.
John Doe, for example, the Court concluded that the legislature intended to create a “civil, nonpunitive regime,” and registration requirements do not impose punitive restraints based largely on the
“Act’s rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose”—public safety
and concern about recidivism.165 And, as previously discussed, the
lower federal circuits have consistently upheld the finding that these
statutory schemes are civil rather than punitive as consonant with
the finding that sex offender registration requirements amount to
mere collateral consequences insufficient for habeas custody.166
162
Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184 (citing Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079,
1093 (9th Cir. 1997)).
163
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91–92, 94–95 (2003).
164
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (“If detention for the
purpose of protecting the community from harm necessarily constituted punishment, then all involuntary civil commitments would have to be considered punishment. But we have never so held.”); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002)
(clarifying the Hendricks holding that there must be a lack-of-control determination for civil commitment to be considered constitutional).
165
Smith, 538 U.S. at 96, 102–03.
166
Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184 (“Another reason to find that the Washington
sex offender law creates a mere collateral consequence of conviction is . . . that
the Washington law is ‘regulatory and not punitive,’ and therefore did not amount
to punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause.”) (citing Russell
v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518,
523 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Although ‘the “in custody” requirement may be satisfied by
restraints other than criminal punishment,” the Ohio Supreme Court’s conclusion
that the sexual-predator statute is a form of civil regulation provides additional
support for our conclusion that the classification, registration, and community notification provisions are more analogous to collateral consequences . . . than to
severe restraints on freedom of movement such as parole.”) (Clay, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (quoting Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184)); Virsnieks v. Smith,
521 F.3d 707, 720 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Wisconsin sexual offender registration
statute is considered remedial, rather than punitive, in nature.”); Calhoun v. Att’y
Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Moreover, the Colorado
sex-offender registration requirements are remedial, not punitive.”).
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The Supreme Court’s potential worry, therefore, is that the inverse may be true. A finding that sex offender registration requirements amount to custody for habeas purposes may belie the Court’s
findings in the ex post facto and double jeopardy contexts that these
requirements do not amount to punishment.167 While the custodial
requirement may be satisfied by both civil and criminal restraints,168
equating registration requirements to probation or parole may consequently give life to the argument that they are in fact punitive
criminal sentencing measures and not “remedial” as legislatures
claim. Because the Court has gone to great lengths to uphold these
schemes, this is a revitalization that the Court is unlikely to resuscitate of its own accord.
In sum, the Court may worry that a finding contrary to Williamson may undermine its own precedent, consequently re-exposing
sex offender registration laws to constitutional attack as violative
punitive regimes.
2. CURBED BY CONGRESS: THE GREATNESS OF THE WRIT
Additionally, though many academic and social commentators
make much ado about the ideological greatness of the writ of habeas
corpus—and argue for expansions of its reach in line with that ideology169—such criticisms seem to overlook the engrained understanding that Congress has the power to confer habeas jurisdiction
upon the federal judiciary.170 As discussed, habeas custody is jurisdictional.171 While a discussion of Congress’s role in an area that
has been stifled judicially172 may seem tangential, it may also act to
inform our understanding of the judiciary’s refusal to extend habeas
custody beyond the scope already established. That is, though
167

See, e.g., Leslie, 296 F.3d at 523.
Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184.
169
See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, The Withered Writ, AM. PROSPECT (July 15,
2013), https://prospect.org/article/withered-writ (“The writ of habeas corpus . . . worked like an incantation to break an evil spell.”); Emanuel Margolis,
Habeas Corpus: The No Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557, 563 (1994);
Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
9, 35 (1990).
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See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 83–84 (1807).
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See supra Part I.
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This is true of courts following the Williamson rationale. Williamson, 151
F.3d at 1184.
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Congress has not expressly delineated what does and does not constitute “custody”—meaning it has not statutorily ruled out sex offender registration—the federal judiciary’s overwhelming refusal to
extend custody to such requirements may be the consequence of an
underlying understanding between both branches that the writ has
not been considered “a generally available federal remedy for every
violation of federal rights.”173
Recent history has “not been generous to habeas.”174 Congress
has remained unsubtle about its aspirations to limit the power of habeas corpus and to establish formalistic procedural hurdles, many of
which are often insurmountable for the average prisoner.175 Its enactment of AEDPA is a manifestation of such aspirations.176
Broadly, the law bans successive petitions, sets a one-year statute of
limitations for habeas claims, narrows the grounds upon which successful habeas claims can be made, and allows claims only to the
extent that challenged convictions are contrary to “clearly established federal law” or an “unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence . . . .”177 The Act’s curtailment of both the procedural and substantive scope of the writ has been—and continues
to be—discussed at length by others elsewhere.178 For our purposes,
it is an example that tends to imply that the judiciary’s limited interpretation of its habeas jurisdiction may in fact be more in line with
the recent spirit of the writ—which critics consistently claim necessitates evolution on par with the current times.179 One may argue
that these limitations have in fact done just that.
173

Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510
(1982).
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Logan, supra note 39, at 148.
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See id.
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996); see Caplan, supra note 6 (explaining that
AEDPA “gutted the federal writ of habeas corpus”).
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28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws:
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–12 (1997) (discussing various
reform proposals for habeas law).
179
See, e.g., Logan, supra note 39, at 149 (“In short, the Article argues that
habeas, as it has for centuries, must evolve in a manner sensitive to contemporary
methods of social control, in this instance the government’s aggressive use of information to achieve control beyond the walls of prison.”). Other articles have
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This is not to say that the Court should inappropriately relinquish
its role as the ultimate arbiter of federal liberties to appease congressional whims. Yet, whether or not one may agree with the value of
limiting the scope of the Great Writ—especially absent explicit congressional mandate to do so—it is undoubted that the legislature’s
clear intent to constrain access to habeas relief will play a role in the
Court’s consideration of whether to extend habeas custody to sex
offender registration requirements.
Thus, given the recent trajectory of the country’s restrictions on
habeas, the evolution of the writ’s “spirit” may lend itself more toward a conservative jurisdictional interpretation of habeas custody.
3. FINALITY
Finally, finality. A long-standing antagonist to the Great Writ,
the concept of finality has rendered federal courts “reluctant to extend the writ beyond its historic purpose.”180 Underlying finality
concerns are that of federalism.181 The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that federal habeas creates a “profound interference with state judicial systems and the finality of state decisions,”
and thus, “should be reserved for those instances in which the federal interest in individual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and finality concerns.”182 A federal habeas scheme that fails
to account for finality would “subvert the criminal process itself.”183
There are distinctions inherent in sex offender registration and
notification regimes that make concerns of finality particularly apparent. For example, as briefly discussed in Juvenile Male, sex
argued that the legislature should itself endeavor to explicitly expand habeas custody to registered sex offenders. See Wendy R. Calaway, Sex Offenders, Custody
and Habeas, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 794 (2018). But, as Professor Calaway
notes, this is a “futile” and “unlikely” resolution. Id.
180
Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512–13
(1982).
181
Id. at 515–16.
182
Id. at 516; see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 525 (1963) (“I rest partly
on the federalist premise, that the abrasions and conflicts created by federal interference with the states’ administration of criminal justice should be avoided in the
absence of felt need . . . .”).
183
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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offender registration laws create independent duties to register once
convicted of an applicable sexual offense.184 That is, though registration requirements are routinely imposed at sentencing “as a mandatory condition of supervised release,”185 sex offenders are also individually required to register—not as a matter of sentencing per se,
but as an independent statutory duty, the violation of which constitutes a separate criminal offense.186 If the requirements were not imposed expressly as part of a petitioner’s sentence, then the subsequent expiration of the sentence would technically constitute an unconditional release, thereby contrary to the Jones Court’s extension
of habeas custody to a petitioner whose “release from physical confinement under the sentence in question was not unconditional.”187
Thus, even if the Court were to find sex offender registration requirements severely restrictive, in order to find them custodial, the
Court would arguably have to extend habeas custody to restrictions
not actually imposed as part of a criminal sentence.188 This extension of habeas is surely not in accord with concerns of finality.189
This is bolstered by the fact that sex offender registration
schemes are often conducted at the local level, and thus, there is an
even greater “tension between the State’s interest in finality and the
asserted federal interest” of access to habeas relief.190
Further, an absence of finality undermines the penological goals
of the criminal justice system—namely, the rehabilitative

184

See United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 938 (2011) (per curiam).
See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2012) (Davis, J., concurring).
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Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (per curiam) (citing Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963)).
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See Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 937–38 (“[T]he duty to register under
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See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (holding that a habeas petitioner is not “in custody”
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(1982).
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process.191 The first step in the effective rehabilitation of offenders
is a “realization by the convict that he is justly subject to sanction,
that he stands in need of rehabilitation.”192 As Justice Harlan noted,
Both the individual criminal defendant and society
have an interest in insuring that there will at some
point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused
not on whether a conviction was free from error but
rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a
useful place in the community.193
Arguably, no such restoration may ever occur if our habeas system
allowed for perpetual litigation for individuals no longer subject to
incarceration and subject to restrictions that the Court has already
deemed remedial.194
As well as undermining the system’s penological goals, a pervasive lack of finality demonstrates a certain “lack of confidence” in
our legal process in its entirety.195 By permitting “endless redetermination of questions” previously addressed—at multiple levels in
the judicial system—we emasculate a general respect for the law.196
An ineffective system is thereby created where justice is perpetually
lingering slightly out of reach.197 As Professor Bator aptly noted,
“Somehow, somewhere, we must accept the fact that human institutions are short of infallible; there is reason for a policy which leaves
well enough alone and which channels our limited resources of

191

See Bator, supra note 182, at 452 (“Furthermore, we should at least tentatively inquire whether an endless reopening of convictions, with its continuing
underlying implication that perhaps the defendant can escape from corrective
sanctions after all, can be consistent with the aim of rehabilitating offenders.”).
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Id.
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Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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See supra Part V.B.1.
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See Bator, supra note 182, at 452.
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John N. Mitchell, U.S. Att’y Gen., Restoring the Finality of Justice, Address Before the Alabama Bar Association (June 25, 1971).
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Bator, supra note 182, at 452 (“The idea of just condemnation lies at the
heart of the criminal law, and we should not lightly create processes which implicitly belie its possibility.”).
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concern toward more productive ends.”198 And such resources are,
in fact, limited.
The federal docket is consistently at its brink. Prisoner petitions
have inundated the federal court system, and habeas corpus accounts
for much of the flooding.199 According to one study, there are an
estimated 752,000 registered sex offenders in the United States.200
This number continues to rise with each newly entered sex conviction. In light of the federal judiciary’s struggle to keep pace with the
flood of petitions from prisoners who are currently incarcerated,201
shall we nevertheless extend habeas custody to hundreds of thousands of registered sex offenders in the system? The Court may well
answer that in the negative, agreeing “[w]e should not encourage the
flow of petitions by expanding the jurisdiction unless there is a felt
need for such expansion.”202 Such a lack of finality would “seriously
distort the very limited resources society has allocated to the criminal process.”203

198

Id. at 453.
See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics2019 (last updated Mar. 31, 2019).
200
How Many in Your State?, supra note 15 (reporting from a study done in
fall of 2019).
201
Cf. Andrew Figueroa, The Standards of Noia, Wainwright, and AEDPA—
An Analysis of the Different Standards and a Proposal of a Possible Alternative,
42 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 385, 400 (2019) (“The leading criticisms against permissive habeas is the notion that federal courts are overwhelmingly inundated
with frivolous habeas petitions and the need to conserve state and federal judicial
resources.”); David Owens, Connecticut Courts Overwhelmed with Inmates’ Petitions for Release, HARTFORD COURANT (May 10, 2018, 5:35 PM)
https://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-habeas-reform-effort-20180502story.html.
202
Bator, supra note 182, at 507.
203
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). As Justice Harlan noted,
While men languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year,
awaiting a first trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to
justify expending substantial quantities of the time and energies
of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly
free from error when made final.
Id.
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Proponents of custodial expansion would argue that the Supreme
Court has consistently affirmed the indispensable precept that “the
principles of comity and finality . . . ‘must yield to the imperative of
correcting a fundamentally unjust’” scheme of punishment.204 Yet,
this argument overlooks the critical notion that sex offender registries are not a—at least de jure—form of punishment. Further, the
liberty interests at stake may not raise the specter necessary to “outweigh[] federalism and finality concerns.”205 Though sex offender
registration requirements are undoubtedly severe, worries about finality are at a low for individuals not actually behind bars. We worry
more about the potentially incorrect “final” condemnation of a prisoner facing a long-term jail sentence than one who has been released
into the community. Thus, finality interests are strengthened in this
context.
CONCLUSION
There are practical reasons why the Court may refuse to extend
habeas custody to sex offender registration and notification requirements. So too are there reasons why the Court may simply choose
to ignore the disarray of the lower courts. Should the Court take the
issue under consideration, however, it would be remiss to perpetuate
the legal fiction advanced by Williamson and its proponents that
these registration requirements do not amount to severe “restraints
o[f] . . . liberty” not imposed on the public generally.206 To do so
would not only undermine the Court’s own precedent but would
more importantly undermine its credibility as the ultimate arbiter of
individual liberties.
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